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Abstract: We consider two opponents that compete in developing asymmetric technologies where each party’s technology is
aimed at damaging (or neutralizing) the other’s technology. The situation we consider is different than the classical problem of
commercial R&D races in two ways: First, while in commercial R&D races the competitors compete over the control of market
share, in our case the competition is about the effectiveness of technologies with respect to certain capabilities. Second, in contrast
with the “winner-takes-all” assumption that characterizes much of the literature on this field in the commercial world, we assume
that the party that wins the race gains a temporary advantage that expires when the other party develops a superior technology.
We formulate a variety of models that apply to a one-sided situation, where one of the two parties has to determine how much to
invest in developing a technology to counter another technology employed by the other party. The decision problems are expressed
as (convex) nonlinear optimization problems. We present an application that provides some operational insights regarding optimal
resource allocation. We also consider a two-sided situation and develop a Nash equilibrium solution that sets investment values, so
that both parties have no incentive to change their investments. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 59: 128–145,
2012
Keywords: arms race; development projects; optimal investment; Nash equilibrium
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider an asymmetric technology race where party
A develops one or more technologies aimed at gaining some
kind of an operational advantage over party D, while D
attempts to develop one or more countermeasures (CMs) that
would neutralize, or at least mitigate, the effect of A’s tech-
nology. We focus on the “tactical” level where the two parties
race, one against the other, in developing asymmetric tech-
nologies and CMs of tactical scale. Our article assumes that
winning the race yields only a “temporary advantage”—if A
completes the development of a certain technology and makes
it operational before D is ready with an appropriate CM, then
A “gains” a certain reward (often measured in terms of the
damage caused to D) per each unit of time until the CMs are
ready and operational. If D wins the race, that is, it is ready
to deploy a CM that is effective against a certain technol-
ogy that A develops but has not yet deployed, then A gains
a smaller reward, which can be as low as zero if D’s CM is
“perfectly” effective against that technology. Each party has
limited resources that can be expended on their respective
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development efforts. We first focus on “one-sided” scenar-
ios in which A has already made its choices and formulate a
sequence of constrained nonlinear optimization models that
can be used by D to determine the amount of resources it
should allocate toward developing CMs in various settings.
Then, we analyze “two-sided” scenarios in which both A
and D need to simultaneously allocate their resources and
determine the existence of Nash Equilibria solutions for the
relevant game theoretical models.
Asymmetrical races with temporary advantages are preva-
lent in defense or security scenarios. For example, during
insurgencies (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan) insurgents develop and
deploy new improvised explosive devices, while government
forces develop measures to counter that threat. Other defense-
related examples include the race between the developers
of advanced antitank missiles and developers of defensive
(passive and reactive) suits for armored vehicles to protect
them from those missiles and electronic warfare where devel-
opers of radars race against developers of radar jamming
devices (see, e.g., Ch. 16 in Ref. 2).
In commercial R&D settings, the military term “arms
race” is often replaced by the term “time-to-market race”
that typically implies a symmetric race where two or more
© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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firms compete in technology markets by developing products
aimed at satisfying the same customers’ needs (e.g., Nokia
competes with Apple on developing evermore advanced
smartphones, GM and Toyota compete on developing better
cars, etc.). In such situations, the race is over who would gain a
larger market share and not about the effectiveness of the tech-
nologies. Asymmetric commercial races of the types modeled
in this article are much less common. A typical example of
such settings is in computers and information security, where
developers of firewalls and other antivirus software compete
with developers of destructive software such as viruses and
trojans, (see, e.g., Refs. 13 and 20). Another example relates
to counterfeit currency, where developers of advanced coun-
terfeit technologies (printers, scanners, etc.) compete against
developers of counterfeit detectors [17].
Temporary advantages in commercial settings are quite
common in markets associated with rapid clockspeed such
as the high-tech industry. Several such environments are
described by Fine [10] who argues that commercial advan-
tages are “always” of a temporary nature, and the differ-
ences among industrial sectors are mainly due to different
technological clockspeeds.
Attempts to mathematically model arms races in the
defense (or security) arena date back to the 1930s. Albeit,
most of these efforts focused at the “strategic” level and not
at the tactical or operational level, as we do in this article. As
early as 1935, Richardson [27] developed a simple model of
coupled differential equations demonstrating the exponential
effect of an arms race, the results of which led him to predict
the Second World War. In a more recent paper, Hunter [16]
follows Richardson’s school of thought by analyzing a three
state arms race through developing and solving systems of
linear difference equations. His modeling approach is dras-
tically different than ours, as it does not focus on the time
it takes to develop new weapons or CMs nor on the rela-
tions between expenditures and development times; budgets
are not modeled explicitly, and there is no game theoreti-
cal aspects in his analysis. Etcheson [9] expands this line of
works by including discussions of the strategies that each
side may choose to optimize its value function. He criticizes
followers of the Richardson tradition for adhering to an atom-
istic and reductionist perspective that denies the relevance of
human values and intentions and offers new theoretical foci
and methodological techniques. Still, the methods he offers
are based on developing and solving systems of equations
rather than the constrained nonlinear optimization and non-
cooperative game theoretical models that are offered in this
article. Finally, as far as we know, there has not been any
attempt to develop normative models for arms race at the
tactical and operational levels.
Symmetric R&D races in commercial settings that typ-
ically apply to controlling market share have been studies
quite extensively in both the Operations Research and the
Economics literature. Much of this literature (e.g., Harris and
Vickers [14], Park [24], Lippman and McCardle [21], and
Golany and Rothblum [12]) adopts the “winner-takes-all”
approach, that is, the first competitor to finish the develop-
ment process receives all the benefit (profit), while the other
competitors gain nothing (and their investments are lost). In
particular, Spector and Zuckerman [30] show that under some
conditions the investment rates in winner-takes-all cases
should increase monotonically as a function of the project
status. Jansen [18] considers a “stealth race” among firms
developing similar technologies where each competitor does
not even know who else is competing, let alone the progress
made by other competitors. Jansen reaches a conclusion that
contradicts that of Spector and Zuckerman—that under some
assumptions the equilibria investment rates should decrease
in time. Ali et al. [1] consider a race similar to the one
described in this article. However, unlike our model that con-
siders continuous resource allocation, they only investigate
two alternatives: “pioneering” and “incremental” projects.
Hopp [15] develops a Markov model of sequential R&D
investment where successful firms are assumed to have an
advantage in follow-up R&D projects. Doraszelski [8] also
develops a model for R&D race where successful firms gain
some temporary advantage (in his case, they do so by accu-
mulating knowledge). Unlike Hopp’s model which assumes
a sequence of stages, Doraszelski builds a continuous time
model. Another sequential model was developed by Ofek
and Sarvary [23] who study dynamic competition from a
marketing perspective where resources such as reputation
and advertising play a role alongside R&D investment. The
dynamics considered in their study are (discrete) multiperiod;
before each period, the competing firms decide how to allo-
cate their resources. Based on the decisions of the firms and
the stochastic market reaction, a “leader” and “followers” are
determined for that period. They analyze the tendency of the
leader and followers to invest more (or less) in R&D projects
as a function of their current R&D competence and market
reputation. The resource allocation decisions in their article
are memoryless; they only depend on the current position of
the firm (being a leader or not). In our model, investment deci-
sions have some memory; the choice of CMs to be developed
depends on the technologies already operational and their
effect.
While the arms-race situation lends itself naturally to a
game-theoretic setting, there are instances where this may
not be the case. In counter-insurgency conflicts the insur-
gents (A) typically use simple existing technologies, which
are well known to the government (D). In these settings, D
typically has an elaborate intelligence network that provides
information regarding A’s intentions and capabilities. Thus,
D can systematically estimate threats by A. On the other hand,
the CMs are technologically advanced and developed by D
under a shroud of secrecy, and thus, A may have very little
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knowledge about the CMs’ development projects and their
development status. For this type of situations, we develop
one-sided optimization models for D where the strategy of
A is fixed and is probabilistically known to D. We formulate
the decision problem of D as a convex optimization problem
that can be solved with standard algorithms. We complement
the modeling of this arms-race situation with a two-sided
game-theoretic model, where both sides consider competitive
strategies, and obtain Nash equilibrium solutions. Arguably,
it may be difficult to rationalize a Nash equilibrium as a real-
istic outcome in this tactical arms-race setting—in particular,
because information may be incomplete. But, the existence
of such equilibrium in this setting can indicate that a tactical
arms race may be contained.
Some interesting results and policy implications emerge
from the models we develop and their analysis. For example,
we address (Section 2.3.1) a specific application in which
the challenge faced by D is to choose between developing a
“quick and weak” CM that will reduce (but not eliminate) the
damages caused by a technology that A has already deployed,
and an advanced CM that will neutralize the threat but will
take longer to develop. Defining the damage reduction as
“effectiveness” and the development rate as “efficiency,” we
show that when the weak CM is effective, then as it becomes
less efficient, it will get more of the resource. This trend is
reversed if that CM is not effective. Moreover, the amount
of resources a weak CM will be allocated is not necessarily
monotone in its efficiency; for low efficiency, the resources
allocated may increase, but for high efficiency, the resources
allocated may actually decrease. Also, as mentioned above,
some other operational insights may be derived from the
existence of a Nash equilibrium.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we set
the stage by specifying assumptions, providing notations,
and explaining our model development logic. We analyze
various scenarios and prove that the resultant optimization
models are convex. We also present a real-world applica-
tion that provides insights about resource allocation among
potential CMs. In Section 3, we study a symmetrical compet-
itive situation and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium
solution. In Section 4, we extend the development to general
distributions, and in Section 5, we summarize the article and
point out possible future extensions.
2. OPTIMIZATION MODELS
As resources invested are traded-off against damage gained
or averted, the two parties are faced with the decision problem
of how to invest their resources. The combination of the two
decision problems results in a nonzero-sum game. Motivated
by the one-sided situation discussed in Section 1, we focus in
this section on D’s problem and assume that A has selected
a specific strategy that is probabilistically known to D.
Let j = 1, . . . , n index the technologies that are developed
by A and let i = 1, . . . , m index the CMs that are developed
by D. For each j , we denote by τj the random time it takes
A to develop the j th technology and assume that these ran-
dom variables have finite expectation. Also, for each i, we
denote by ξi(xi) the random time it takes D to develop the ith
CM, when the budget allocated for its development is xi ≥ 0.
Each expectation E[ξi(xi)] is assumed to be finite, and the
function E[ξi(·)] is assumed to be decreasing and concave
in xi ; in particular, we assume that E[ξi(0)] < ∞ and refer
to this condition as the “nondegeneracy assumption.” In the
degenerate case where E[ξi(0)] = ∞, the cost associated
with 0 expenditure is very large; our analysis can then be
carried out by imposing a threshold investment level (that D
will implement to avoid high costs).
In this section and the next one, we assume that the devel-
opment times of the technologies and the CMs have exponen-
tial distributions and that these times are jointly independent
across technologies and CMs. Specifically, τj has exponential
distribution with parameter λj , j = 1, . . . , n, and ξi(xi) has
exponential distribution with parameter μi(xi), i = 1, . . . , m
(rate ∞ of an exponential distribution means that the corre-
sponding random variable is set deterministically to 0). We
refer to λj as the development intensity parameter of technol-
ogy j , and to μi(xi) as the development intensity function of
CM i. It is assumed throughout that each of the functionsμi(·)
is increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable; the
nondegeneracy assumption asserts that μi(0) > 0 for each i.
The assumption about exponential distributions is common
in related literature (e.g., Ref. 1); yet, it is relaxed in Section
4 where we consider general distributions.
Given a finite budget C, the problem of D is to decide
how much to invest in each CM so as to minimize the total
cost. Here, the total cost consists of the investment itself and
the expected cumulative damage over the time period from
the moment a certain technology that A developed becomes
operational to the moment an effective CM (i.e., one that neu-
tralizes the threat) becomes available. The damage inflicted
by A’s technology is assumed to be linear in the duration of
the exposure, with damage rates dependent on the effective-
ness of the available CMs. Damage across A’s technologies
is assumed to be additive. Later on in this section, we discuss
the damage function in more detail.
The following lemma will be useful for our development.
LEMMA 1: Let τ and ξ(x) be independent exponen-
tial random variables with positive parameters λ and μ(x),
respectively. Then





μ(x)[μ(x) + λ] ; (1)
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Table 1. Summary of tractable cases addressed in Section 2.
No. of No. of CMs’ CMs’
Section technologies CMs effectiveness development
2.1 1 1 Full/partial Not applicable
2.2 n m Full Parallel
2.3 n m Partial Parallel
2.4 1 2 Partial Series
further, if μ(·) is increasing and concave, then E[ξ(·) −
min{ξ(·), τ }] is decreasing and convex.
PROOF: The first equality in (1) follows from standard
properties of the exponential distribution and the second
equality is trite. Next, the middle expression of (1) can be
expressed as (g ◦ μ)(x), where ◦ denotes the composition
operation over functions and g(y) = 1
y
− 1
y+λ for y > 0. As
g(·) is convex and decreasing andμ(·) is concave and increas-
ing, standard arguments show that (g ◦ μ)(·) is convex and
decreasing. 
In the following subsections, we model and analyze several
scenarios, summarized in Table 1.
2.1. One Technology and One CM
In this subsection, we consider the situation where A is
developing a single technology and D is developing a sin-
gle CM. Let d represents the damage per unit-time when
A’s technology is operational, while the CM is not yet ready.
We assume that when it is ready, the CM provides full pro-
tection. This “one-on-one” scenario is presented to illustrate
the analysis to follow. For convenience, we drop the indices
i(= 1) and j(= 1).
The problem that D faces—how to optimally allocate its
resource, given a budget C—is
Program I: min W(x) ≡ x + dE[ξ(x) − min{ξ(x), τ }]
s.t. 0 ≤ x ≤ C. (2)
By Lemma 1, the objective function of Program I (for the
exponential case) is








Lemma 1 further implies that the function W(x) given by
(3) is convex. Consequently, the solution of Program I is given
by the next lemma (whose proof is standard and is left to the
reader).
LEMMA 2: Program I has an optimal solution. If W ′(0) ≥
0, then the optimal solution of Program I has x∗ = 0. If
W ′(0) < 0 and W ′(C) ≤ 0 then x∗ = C. Otherwise,
0 ≤ x∗ ≤ C.
The convexity of W(·) implies that Program I can be
solved by standard methods such as bisection (e.g., Ref. 4,
Chapter 8).
The analysis above also applies to situations where the
CM only provides a partial protection against A’s technology,
rather than complete elimination of its potential damage. In
such cases, d represents the per unit-time reduction in the
damage caused by A’s technology due to the availability of
the CM, and the benchmark is the damage inflicted by the
technology with the CM in place. The objective is then to
minimize the sum of the cost of the damage exceeding this
benchmark and the cost spent on the development of the CM.
For example, if the CM provides (when available) full pro-
tection with probability 0 < p < 1 against damage D per
unit-time of the technology, we will have d = pD.
2.1.1. Special Case: Operational Technology and Linear
Development Intensity Function
Assume that A’s technology is operational, that is, λ = ∞,
and that the development intensity function is linear and is
given by μ(x) = ax + b, with a, b > 0. Here, a is the rate
of the variable development intensity—the contribution of
each dollar added to the (temporal) development-budget of
the CM—and b is the fixed “no-cost” intensity of obtaining a
capability for countering A’s technology by other means such
as obtaining a CM that is developed by others. In this case,
W(x) = x + d
ax + b , (4)
the optimal allocation x∗ is
x∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩







da ≤ b + aC
C if b + aC < √da,
(5)
and the optimal cost is













da ≤ b + aC
C + d




Evidently, x∗ = x∗(a, b, C, d) is piecewise linear and non-
increasing in b. Moreover, the decision how much to invest
(if at all) depends on the difference between two expressions
that stem from the CM’s characteristics, namely,
√
da and b.
We next examine the dependence of the optimal cost W ∗ =
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Figure 1. Cost at optimality as a function of the budget for the
case b = 0.
b2 ≥ da, then (6) shows that W ∗(C) equals d
b
, independently
of C. Alternatively, if b2 < da, then W ∗(C) = C + d
aC+b for






for C > γ .
It follows that W ∗(C) is convex and nonincreasing (decreas-
ing for C ∈ [0, γ ]), demonstrating that the budget C exhibits
decreasing marginal returns on the optimal cost. Figure 1
depicts W ∗(C) for the case where the no-cost capability does
not exist, that is, b = 0.
2.2. Multiple CMs with 0–1 Effectiveness Developed
in Parallel
Suppose m and n are arbitrary and for each technology
j = 1, . . . , n there is a set I (j) ⊆ {1, . . . , m} such that for
i ∈ I (j), CMi (the ith CM) provides, when available, full
protection against technology j . So, technology j is rendered
ineffective in the presence of CMi , i ∈ I (j). Absent any
effective CM (i.e., any CMi i ∈ I (j)), technology j causes
damage dj per unit-time. The development of multiple CMs
(in parallel) represents a scenario known in the literature
as “parallel funding” (see e.g., Refs. 3 and 11). Such situ-
ations occur when, due to imminent threat, a defense agency
authorizes several contractors to develop in parallel equally
effective CMs, although all it really needs is just a single
operational CM.
The effect of multiple technologies that A develops is
assumed to be additive; the optimization problem that D faces
is then the following extension of Program I (with decision
vector x = (x1, . . . , xm))




















xi ≤ C, xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , m.
(7)
Using Lemma 1, the objective function of Program II (for













i∈I (j) μi(xi) + λj
]
. (8)
LEMMA 3: The objective function W(x) in (8) is (jointly)
convex in x = (x1, . . . , xn).
PROOF: Each of the bracketed terms on the right-hand








and h(x) = ∑i∈I (j) μi(xi); its convexity then
follows from standard arguments and the facts thatg is convex
and decreasing, and h is concave. 
Lemma 3, along with the presence of a polyhedral feasible
set, assures that the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions
are necessary and sufficient for optimality of a feasible solu-
tion of Program II. These conditions are next expressed in
terms of the n variables x1, . . . , xn that are feasible for Pro-
gram II, non-negative multipliersα1, . . . , αn corresponding to
the non-negativity constraints and a non-negative multiplier
β corresponding to the capacity constraint:
αi − β = ∂W(x)
∂xi








λj +∑k∈I (j) μk(xk))2
⎤⎥⎦ ,
i = 1, . . . , m, (9)










where for i = 1, . . . , m, J (i) ≡ {j = 1, . . . , n : i ∈ I (j)}.
Standard algorithms for convex NLPs can be used to solve
Program II, or equivalently, (9)–(11) (e.g., [5, 6, 22]).
2.2.1. Analysis of Special Cases
Case 1: Uniform Effectiveness of All CMs with Respect
to All Technologies. Here, we assume that I (j) = {1, . . . , n}
for each j = 1, . . . , n, i.e., each CM is effective against all of
A’s technologies. We also assume that the CMs’ development
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
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intensity functions μi(x) are strictly increasing and strictly
concave. For this case, we show a simple method for solving
(9)–(11). We first discuss the case where under the optimal
solution, say x∗, each CM is allocated a positive amount of
the resource, and in addition, the resource is fully utilized. In
this case, (10) implies that αi = 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n, and
(11) yields no restriction on β (except for non-negativity).
By (9), the values of the μ′i (x∗i )’s for i = 1, . . . , n are then
equal and their common value, say η, satisfies











λj +∑mk=1 μk(x∗k ))2
]
. (12)
As each μi(·) is strictly concave, its derivative is strictly
decreasing and therefore the derivative has an inverse that we
denote gi(·); in particular, for i = 1, . . . , n, μ′i (x∗i ) = η is
equivalent to x∗i = gi(η). For each i, let hi ≡ μi ◦ gi , then
(12) becomes














i=1 xi = C is expressed by∑m
i=1 gi(η) = C. As each μ′i (·) is strictly decreasing, so are
the gi(·)’s and ∑mi=1 gi(·). It follows that solving (9)–(11) is
reduced to determine η for which the strictly decreasing func-
tion
∑m
i=1 gi(·) attains the value C. This can be accomplished
by bisection (or other methods). If the above calculation leads
to β < 0, then the assumption that the budget is fully utilized
in the optimal solution is violated. Further, as
∑m
i=1 gi(·) is
decreasing, η decreases as the budget C increases (when it is
binding); as x∗i = gi(η) for each i = 1, . . . , m, we conclude
that each x∗i is an increasing function of the budget C.
When some of the optimal xis are zero, the above approach
applies with minor modifications. In this case, the μ′i (xi)’s
are equal for the indices i with xi > 0, say they equal η.
For each z, let gi(z) ≡ max{(μ′i )−1(η), 0}. Solving (9)–(11)
is then accomplished by finding η for which the decreasing
function
∑m
i=1 gi(·) attains the value C, setting xi = gi(η)
for each i and setting the values of αis so that (9) is satisfied
(if xi = gi(η) = 0, then η > (μ′i )(xi) and αi determined by
(9) is non-negative). It follows that the optimal values xis are
monotone in the budget C.
The above solution method resembles the classic solu-
tion of nonlinear (convex) knapsack problems with separable
objective functions (e.g., Refs. 4 and 7).
The above analysis extends to situations where each
CM only eliminates part of the damage caused by A’s
technologies, but all CMs have the same effect.
Case 2: Uniform Effectiveness of All CMs with Respect
to All Technologies and Linear Development Intensity
Functions. Similarly to Section 2.1.1, we assume that the
CM development intensity functions are linear and are given
by μi(x) = aix + bi with ai > 0, bi ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . , m.
For each i, the parameter ai is the rate of the variable develop-
ment intensity, while bi is the fixed no-cost intensity. If none
of A’s technologies is operational at time 0, that is, λj < ∞











i=1 aixi + B
− 1∑m










i=1 aixi + B
) (∑m
i=1 aixi + B + λj
)]
where B = ∑mi=1 bi . Using elementary arguments, it can be
shown that an optimal solution of Program II is obtained by
selecting i∗ ∈ arg maxi ai , setting xi = 0 for i = i∗ and






(ai∗x + B)(ai∗x + B + λj )
]
(14)
over 0 ≤ x ≤ C. If some of A’s technologies are opera-
tional at time 0, one gets the same conclusions except that
the bracketed terms in (14) corresponding operational tech-
nologies (λj = ∞) are replaced, respectively, by djai∗x+B . If
all of A’s technologies are operational at time 0, (14) becomes
x + 

ai∗x + B , (15)
where 
 = ∑nj=1 dj ; the problem of determining the optimal
value of xi∗ then reduces to the problem considered, solved,
and analyzed in Section 2.1.1.
Case 3: One-to-One Technology-CM Correspondence.
Here, we assume that n = m and I (j) = {j} for each j ,
that is, there is a one-to-one matching between the set of
CMs and the set of A’s technologies; each technology can be
neutralized by one specific CM and that CM is completely
ineffective against the rest of A’s technologies. If no technol-
ogy is operational at time 0, that is, λj < ∞ for each j , the
cost function given by (8) becomes
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav


















Thus, the objective function W(x) is the sum of m func-
tions, each being a (strictly) convex function of a single
decision variable. The problem of minimizing W(x) over
{x ∈ IRn : x ≥ 0,∑mi=1 xi ≤ C} is then reduced to an
instance of the classic (strictly) convex knapsack problem
(e.g., [4]). This reduction also holds when some of A’s tech-
nologies are operational at time 0; the only difference is that
the terms [xi + diλiμi (xi )(μi (xi )+λi ) ] in the above equation corre-
sponding to technologies already operational (λj = ∞) are
replaced, respectively, by [xi + diμi (xi ) ]. In particular, if all of









Whether or not A’s technologies are operational, the cost
function W(x) can be expressed as a sum
∑m
i=1 fi(xi), where
each fi is strictly convex. In this case, the KKT conditions
(see (9)–(11)) show that the optimal solution x∗ is expressed
in terms of a multiplier β ≥ 0 such that
x∗i =
{
0 if f ′i (0) ≥ 0
gi(β) if f ′i (0) < 0
(17)
where gi is the inverse function of f ′i (as fi is strictly convex,
f ′i is strictly increasing, assuring that gi is well defined and










i = C (i.e., the budget is bind-
ing), ∑i∈I gi(β) = C, implying that C is increasing in β
and therefore for each i ∈ I , x∗i = gi(β) increases as C
increases. Thus, an increase (or decrease) of the budget results
in increases (respectively, decreases) in the allocation for each
(active) CM.
Case 4: One-to-One Technology-CM Correspondence,
Linear Development Intensity Functions and Operational
Technologies. Here, the assumption of case 3 is augmented
with the assumptions that the CM development intensity
functions are linear, expressed by μi(x) = aix + bi , with
ai > 0 and bi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , m, and that all of A’s tech-
nologies are operational, that is, λi = ∞ for each i. In this








and (9) becomes αi − β = 1 − aidi(aixi+bi )2 . Thus, if x∗ is an
optimal solution and α1, . . . , αn, β are multipliers satisfying
(9)–(10), then for i = 1, . . . , n,
[
x∗i = 0
] ⇒ [0 ≤ αi = 1 + β − aidi
b2i
]












0 < x∗i =
√
di








0 if (1 + β)b2i ≥ aidi√
di
ai(1 + β) −
bi
ai
if (1 + β)b2i < aidi .
(18)





i . Hence, when the budget is binding,
C = ∑mi=1 x∗i is decreasing in β; on the other hand, when the
budget is not binding, β = 0. We conclude that if the bud-
get is cut from C to C ′ < C, the corresponding multipliers
satisfy β ′ ≥ β ≥ 0 and the effect on each x∗i > 0 is that the
term − bi
ai








1+β ′ < 1. The latter reflects the well-known
“cut across the board” effect (see Ref. 29).
2.3. Multiple Parallel CMs with Varying Effectiveness
Developed in Parallel
Here, we consider situations where D is developing, in
parallel, multiple CMs, which can only provide partial pro-
tection against A’s technologies. Specifically, we assume that
the effect of a subset of CMs coincides with that of the most
effective CM in that set. We present an explicit optimization
problem for determining D’s optimal use of its resource and
show that this optimization problem is convex and therefore
tractable.
We start by considering the case of a single technology
(n = 1), and rank the m CMs from least to most effective,
that is, d = d0 ≥ d1 ≥ . . . ≥ dm−1 ≥ dm. The para-
meter di expresses the damage rate, when the technology is
operational and CMi is available (possibly with any subset
of {CM1, . . . , CMi−1}). Also, d0 is the damage rate in the
absence of any CM. Note the difference between di and dj
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used in Section 2.2 (di indicates the damage inflicted by a cer-
tain technology in the presence of CMi , whereasdj represents
the damage from technology j in the absence of any CM).
For a given resource allocation x = (x1, . . . , xm) and
i = 0, . . . , m, let ξ 〈i〉(x) ≡ min{ξi(xi), . . . , ξm(xm)} and
ξ̂ 〈i〉(x) ≡ min{ξ 〈i〉, τ }, with ξ 〈0〉(x) = ξ̂ 〈0〉(x) = 0. In partic-
ular, ξ 〈i〉(x) is the earliest time-instance when CMi or a more
effective CM becomes available.
To simplify notation, we suppress the arguments of ξi(xi),
ξ 〈i〉(x), and ξ̂ 〈i〉(x) and write ξi , ξ 〈i〉, and ξ̂ 〈i〉, respectively.
The time-interval Ii , during which the damage rate is di ,
depends on the value of τ and is given by
Ii =
⎧⎨⎩
[ξ 〈i〉, ξ 〈i+1〉] if τ ≤ ξ 〈i〉
(τ , ξ 〈i+1〉] if ξ 〈i〉 < τ ≤ ξ 〈i+1〉
∅ if τ > ξ 〈i+1〉.
(19)
The length of Ii in (19) can be expressed by the unified term
[(ξ 〈i+1〉−ξ 〈i〉)− (̂ξ 〈i+1〉− ξ̂ 〈i〉)] and thus the expected damage
inflicted by A’s technology is expressed by
m−1∑
i=0




(di−1 − di)[ξ 〈i〉 − ξ̂ 〈i〉].
It follows that the optimization problem that D faces is











xi ≤ C and x1, . . . , xm ≥ 0.
(20)
As each ξi(x) and ξ̂ 〈i〉(x) is a minimum of independent
exponential random variables, it follows that the objective
















LEMMA 4: The objective function W(x) in (21) is jointly
convex in x = (x1, . . . , xm).
PROOF: Consider the ith summand in the second term of
the left-hand side of (21). It can be expressed as (g ◦ h)(x)







andh(x) = ∑mk=i μi(xi).
The convexity of g ◦ h follows immediately from the facts
that g is convex and decreasing and h is concave. 
Lemma 4, along with the presence of a polyhedral feasible
set, assures that the KKT conditions are necessary and suf-
ficient for optimality and that standard convex optimization
techniques can be used to solve Program III. But, the solution
method described in Section 2.2 does not generalize to the
case where the CMs have distinct effects.
We next consider the case where there A developed mul-
tiple technologies whose joint damage is additive and the
rankings of the effectiveness of the CMs against these tech-
nologies are the same. For each i and j , let dji be the per
unit-time damage of technology j in the presence of CMi
and let ξ̂ 〈i〉j (x) ≡ min{ξ 〈i〉j (x), τj } with d = d0j ≥ d1j ≥
. . . ≥ dm−1j ≥ dmj for each j . Then, the objective function of



































As the sum of convex functions in x, W(x) is convex in x.
We note that the convexity is preserved without the assump-
tion that the effectiveness rankings of the CMs are uniform
against all of A’s technologies; but, in this case, the second
term in (22) becomes more complicated.
2.3.1. Single Operational Technology and Two CMs
For many years, the south-western part of Israel has been
subject to mortar and makeshift missile attacks from the Gaza
Strip. While quite primitive and inaccurate, these weapons
have disrupted the daily life in that region, causing significant
economic, social, and psychological damages. Several poten-
tial CMs have been proposed to mitigate the effect of these
attacks. These CMs range from high-energy Laser beams
[31] through high-velocity high-density projectiles (e.g., the
land-based Phalanx system [26]), to Iron Dome missile inter-
ceptors [19]. The CMs vary in effectiveness and expected
development time. The Israeli government, faced with com-
peting proposals for developing CMs for the short-range
missiles’ threat, has to decide how to allocate its resources
among those proposed CMs such that the expected damage
is minimized. A common situation is to decide how to allo-
cate resources between two CMs: one that is slow to develop
while being very effective (totally eliminating the threat) and
another that can be developed faster but is less effective and
provides only partial reduction in damage.
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Figure 2. Fraction of resources for CM1 as a function of the
relative effectiveness ρ (parallel development).
Thus, suppose that A’s single technology is already oper-
ational (λ = ∞), and D has to decide how to distribute its
resources between two possible CMs. While CM2 can elim-
inate the threat altogether (d2 = 0), CM1 is only capable
of reducing the damage from its current rate of d0 per time-
period to 0 < d1 < d0. However, with the same amount
of resources, CM1 can be developed faster than CM2, that
is, ξ1(x) stochastically dominates ξ2(x) for all x. Without
loss of generality, the total budget of D is assumed to be 1.
We also assume that the potential damage is very large com-
pared to the resources invested in the development of the
CMs and therefore, we exclude the development cost from
the objective function. In other words, D will always uti-
lize all of its available resources, and the only question is
how to distribute the resources between the two CMs. Let
μi(xi) = aixi , where xi is the fraction of the resource allo-
cated to CMi , i = 1, 2, x1 + x2 = 1. Let p ≡ d0d1 > 1, then
ρ = d0−d1
d0
= 1 − p−1 < 1 is the “relative effectiveness” of
CM1. Let q ≡ a1a2 be the “development efficiency ratio” of
the two CMs. Clearly q > 1 must hold, because otherwise
the decision is trivial: invest all the resources in the more








s.t. 0 ≤ x < 1. (23)
where x is the fraction of resources invested in the less









s.t. 0 ≤ x < 1. (24)
The value of x that minimizes (24) is
x∗ =
√
(p − 1)(q − 1) − 1
q + √(p − 1)(q − 1) − 1 . (25)
Notice that 0 ≤ x∗ < 1, as expected. So, one must always
allocate some resources for the “perfect” CM1. The solu-
tion of the optimization problem is expressed in terms of the
two parameters—the relative effectiveness ρ = 1 − p−1 and
the development efficiency ratio q. Notice that for a fixed
q, x∗ → 1 as ρ → 1 ; if CM2 becomes as effective as
CM1, D would better invest all of its resources in the more
timely CM. For a fixed p, x∗ → 0 as q → ∞; if the devel-
opment efficiency of the imperfect CM2 can be increased
indefinitely, D should allocate to CM2 just the required min-
imum amount, which approaches 0. An interesting limiting
behavior is observed when ρ → 1(p → ∞), q → ∞ and
q
p
→ υ. In that case x∗ → 11+√υ . That is, if CM1 is very
effective (very small d1 value), which implies large invest-
ment of resources, and very efficient (very large a1 value),
which implies the sufficiency of a small investment, and the
two parameters are improved while maintaining a fixed ratio,
υ, then the tradeoff between these two trends is captured by
1
1+√υ . For example, if p = q  1, then one half of the
resources should be allocated to the “imperfect” CM1.
Figure 2 presents the effect of the two parameters—the
relative effectiveness ρ and the development efficiency ratio
q—on the optimal fraction of resources allocated for CM1.
Clearly, for a fixed q, the fraction of resources allocated to
CM1 is nondecreasing in ρ; more effective CMs receive more
resources. For example, if CM1 reduces damage by only
10%, it gets no resources unless its development rate per unit
resource (a1) is at least 16 times larger than a2. However, the
reverse is not true; for a fixed ρ, x is not necessarily monot-
one in q, as shown in Fig. 3. For example, if ρ = 0.9, which
means that CM1 reduces the damage rate by 90%, then the
fraction of resources allocated to CM1 initially increases with
q, as expected, but then decreases as this ratio gets larger. If
the development process of CM1 is very efficient, there is no
need to invest much in that CM—it would be more effective
to divert resources to the more effective CM2.
The main policy insight from this analysis is captured in
the two figures; at certain ranges of the efficiency ratio q,
Figure 3. Fraction of resources for CM1 as a function of the
development efficiency ratio q (parallel development).
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investment policies may be contradictory for different levels
of effectiveness ratios. For example, if CM1 is quite effective
(say ρ = 0.9), then the more efficient it is (say, q ≥ 3), the
less resources it will get. However, at the same range, if that
CM is relatively ineffective (say ρ = 0.3), then the reverse
is true; the more efficient CM would receive more resources
(up to a certain threshold).
2.4. A Single Technology and Multiple CMs
Developed in Series
In this section, we formulate situations with a single tech-
nology that was developed by A and multiple CMs developed
sequentially, rather than in parallel, by D. We first consider
the case of two CMs (m = 2), which is shown to be tractable.
The first CM, when completed, provides partial response to
A’s technology. The development of the second CM starts
once the first CM is operational. Such situations may occur,
when the development of the first CM is an intermediary nec-
essary stage for development of the second CM. Absent any
CM, the per unit-time damage of A’s technology is d0. When
only the first CM is operational, the damage rate is reduced
to d1 < d0, and when both CMs are operational, the damage
rate of A’s technology is reduced to 0.
For a given x = (x1, x2), let ξ¯1, ξ¯2, and τ¯ be realizations of
the development times of the two CMs and A’s technology,
respectively. If τ¯ ≤ ξ¯1, then the damage is d0(ξ¯1−τ¯ )+d1(ξ¯2).
If ξ¯1 < τ¯ ≤ ξ¯1 + ξ¯2, then the damage is d1(ξ¯1 + ξ¯2 − τ¯ ).
Finally, if τ¯ > ξ¯1 + ξ¯2, then there is no damage. For brevity,
we shall suppress the dependency on x. The total expected
damage is given by
P [τ ≤ ξ1]{d0E[ξ1 − τ |τ ≤ ξ1] + d1E[ξ2]}
+ P [ξ1 < τ ≤ ξ1 + ξ2]d1E[ξ1 + ξ2 − τ |ξ1 < τ ≤ ξ1 + ξ2].
(26)
The next lemma provides explicit representations for the
terms in (26).
LEMMA 5: If ξ1, ξ2, and τ are independent exponential
random variables with parameters μ1, μ2, and λ, respectively,
then
P [τ ≤ ξ1] = λ
λ + μ1
P [ξ1 < τ ≤ ξ1 + ξ2] = μ1
λ + μ1 ·
λ
λ + μ2
E[ξ1 − τ |τ ≤ ξ1] = 1
μ1
E[ξ1 + ξ2 − τ |ξ1 < τ ≤ ξ1 + ξ2] = 1
μ2
.
PROOF: The first two equalities are standard results about
the minimum of independent exponential random variables.
The last two equalities follow from the memoryless property
of the exponential distribution. 
Lemma 5 allows us to formulate D’s decision problem by
the following program.
Program IV: min W(x) ≡
{


























s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ C and x1, x2 ≥ 0. (27)
We observe that the objective function of Program IV can
be expressed as






























































(λ + μ1(x1))(λ + μ2(x2))
]
. (28)
LEMMA 6: The objective function W(x) of Program IV
is (jointly) convex in x = (x1, x2).
PROOF: The first four terms in the sum last expression
in (28) are clearly jointly convex in (x1, x2). The last term








; now, g ◦ h is convex, because g is




is positive definite for y, z > 0), and
h is concave. 
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Lemma 6, along with the presence of a polyhedral feasible
set, ensures that the KKT conditions are necessary and suf-
ficient for optimality and that standard convex optimization
techniques can be used to solve Program IV.
We next outline the extension of the above analysis to mul-
tiple CMs that are developed in series. If A’s single technology
is operational, the damage rate when CM1, . . . , CMi are avail-
able is di , with d1 ≥ d2 ≥ . . . ≥ dm. Also, as before, in the
absence of any CM, the damage rate is d0 ≥ d1.
Consider a given resource allocationx = (x1, . . . , xm)with
xi for i = 1, . . . , m as the amount of the resource allocated to
the development of CMi . For brevity, we suppress the depen-
dence ofμi and ξi on xi . LetTi ≡ ∑iu=1 ξu(xu) (withT0 = 0),
that is, Ti is the random completion time of CMi . Extending
Lemma 5, we have that for i = 1, . . . , m,











E[Ti − τ |Ti−1 < τ ≤ Ti] = 1
μi
.
By conditioning on the identity of the interval (Ti−1, Ti] in
which A’s technology becomes operational, we have that the
total expected damage is given by
m∑
i=1






















So, the optimization problem that D faces can be expressed
by





















s.t. x1, . . . , xm ≥ 0 and
m∑
i=1
xi ≤ C. (29)
The objective function of Program IV′ with m = 2 equals the
objective function of Program IV. However, analyzing the
convexity of the objective function of Program IV’ for m > 2
seems to be a difficult task that is hereby posed as an open
problem.
2.4.1. Single Operational Technology, CM1 Must Be
Developed Before CM2
Consider a similar situation as in Section 2.3.1. Specifi-
cally, λ = ∞, C = 1 and D has to decide how to distribute its
resources between two possible CMs developed in sequence.
The less effective CM1, which is developed first, reduces
the damage from its current rate of d0 per time-period to
0 < d1 < d0. When the perfectly effective CM2 is com-
pleted, then the damage rate of A’s technology is reduced
to 0. Similar to Section 2.3.1, we assume that the potential
damage is very large compared to the resources invested in
the development of the CMs, and therefore, the resources are
fully utilized. Let μi(xi) = aixi , where xi is the fraction of
the resource allocated to CMi , i = 1, 2, x1 + x2 = 1. Let
p ≡ d0
d1
> 1, then ρ = d0−d1
d0
= 1 − p−1 < 1 is the rela-
tive effectiveness of CM1. Let q ≡ a1a2 be the development









s.t. 0 ≤ x < 1. (30)
where x is the fraction of resources invested in the less











s.t. 0 ≤ x < 1. (31)




p + √q (32)
and the optimal objective is


















Figures 4 and 5 are similar to Figs. 2 and 3, respec-
tively. Figure 6 provides a comparison between the parallel
case presented in Section 2.3.1 and the serial case presented
here. Notice the profound difference between the parallel and
sequential development cases. First, while Fig. 3 is unimodal
(see discussion in Section 2.3.1), the comparable plot for the
serial case is (strictly) monotone decreasing; the more effi-
cient the development process of the less effective CM that
must be developed first, the less resources are needed for its
development. Second, as one would expect and as shown in
Fig. 6, the parallel case is obviously superior; ceteris paribus,
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Figure 4. Fraction of resources for CM1 as a function of the
relative effectiveness ρ (serial development).
the expected damage from a parallel development situation is
always smaller than the damage from a serial development.
The gap is significant for small values of q, that is, when
the development process of the imperfect CM1 is inefficient
compared to the more effective CM2. Thus, serial develop-
ment only occurs when there are manpower or technological
constraints such that to reach the ultimate perfect CM, one
must pass through an intermediate stage that provides partial
effectiveness. Figure 6 illustrates the cost of such constraints,
when the damage reduction by the imperfect CM1 is 50%.
3. EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
In this section, we relax the assumption that the rates at
which A develops its technologies are fixed and study a
game-theoretic situation where both parties act strategically.
Specifically, as for D, the random time it takes A to develop its
technologies depends on its resource allocation. The objec-
tive of A is to maximize the expected damage inflicted on
D less its own development expenses. The objective of D is
Figure 5. Fraction of resources for CM1 as a function of the
efficiency ratio q (serial development).
Figure 6. Minimum cost for parallel and serial development,
ρ = 0.5.
to minimize the sum of its development expenses and the
expected damage that A’s technologies will cause.
As in Section 2, the damage inflicted by different technolo-
gies is additive, and the damage caused by each technology
is proportional to the length of time it is effective. Moreover,
the term “damage,” is replaced by the term “value of dam-
age” and we let these values to be different for D and A. In
other words, the value of the damage inflicted by technology
j of A on D is dDj for D and dAj for A. For each j = 1, . . . , n,
τj and λj are functions of the amount yj that A allocates
to the development of technology j . The intensities λj (·) are
non-negative increasing, concave, and continuously differen-
tiable. The budget constraint of A is CA, so that the allocation
y = (y1, . . . , yn) must satisfy∑nj=1 yj ≤ CA. The rest of the
assumptions and notation are as in Section 2.
Let WD(x, y) and WA(x, y) denote the cost functions of D
and A, respectively, and let X and Y denote the set of feasible
allocations. We use the superscripts I, II, III, and IV to refer
to the four programs of Section 2. A pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ X × Y
is a Nash equilibrium, if the following two conditions hold
WD(x, y
∗) ≥ WD(x∗, y∗) for each x ∈ X, (34)
WA(x
∗
, y) ≥ WA(x∗, y∗) for each y ∈ Y . (35)
A classic result of Rosen [28] shows that if the feasible sets
X and Y are convex and compact, WD(x, y) and WA(x, y)
are continuous on X × Y , WD(x, y) is convex in x for each
y ∈ Y , and WA(x, y) is convex in y for each x ∈ X, then a
Nash equilibrium exists.
3.1. One Technology and One CM
First, we consider the case of a single technology devel-
oped by A and single CM developed by D and apply the
assumptions of Section 2.1. Allowing λ to be a function of the
allocation y of A, the cost functions of D and A are given by:
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W ID(x, y) = x + dD[E[ξ(x) − min{ξ(x), τ(y)}]








W IA(x, y) = y − dA[E[ξ(x) − min{ξ(x), τ(y)}]








PROPOSITION 1: The two-person game defined by (36)
and (37) over (x, y) ∈ X × Y has a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF: The arguments of the paragraph following Pro-




(x, y) = − λ′′(y)[μ(x)+λ(y)]2 + 2λ
′2
[μ(x)+λ(y)]3 ≥ 0, WA(x, y) is
convex in y. As the feasible sets for both parties are convex
and compact, andWA andWD are continuous, the existence of
a Nash equilibrium follows from the aforementioned classic
result of Rosen [28]. 
3.1.1. Linear Development Intensity Functions
Let μ(x) = aDx + bD and λ(y) = aAy, where aD > 0
and aA > 0 are rates of the corresponding variable devel-
opment intensities and bD > 0 is the no-cost capacity of D.
Suppressing the superscript “I,” we then have
WD(x, y) = x + dD
[
1
aDx + bD −
1




WA(x, y) = y − dA
[
1
aDx + bD −
1




We also assume that A and D have enough resources such
that there are no effective budget constraints on either sides.
This is the case, for example, when CD > d
D
bD
and CA > d
A
bD
(for if x > dD
bD




bD+aAy = WD(0, y), and if y > d
A
bD
, then for each x ≥ 0,
WA(x, y) > y − dAbD > 0 = WA(x, 0)).
Due to the strict convexity ofWD(x, y) inx and ofWA(x, y)




(x, y) = 1 − d
DaD
(aDx + bD)2 +
dDaD





(x, y) = 1 − d
AaA
(aDx + bD + aAy)2 , (41)
with the inequalities in (40) and/or (41) holding as equalities
when, respectively, x > 0 and/or y > 0.














































. The right-hand side of (43) is always
positive, whereas the right-hand side of (42) is positive if and
only if bD < 
. The equality version of (41) has a unique





Here, y > 0 if and only if bD <
√
dAaA and (0, y) satisfies












The equality version of (40) can never be satisfied by (x, y)
with y = 0. Finally, (0,0) always satisfies (40), and it satis-
fies (41) if and only if bD ≥
√
dAaA. It follows that a unique




























The above expression illustrates an intuitive dependence
of the (unique) Nash equilibrium on the no-cost capacity of D
(bD). When bD is small, A and D will invest, respectively, in
developing a technology and a CM. When bD is large, neither
party will invest. But, when bD is at an intermediary level, A
will invest, whereas D will not. A situation where D invests,
whereas A does not, will not occur.
It is noted that the above analysis can be extended
(with minor modifications) to allow for non-negative no-cost
capacity for A.
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3.2. Multiple Parallel CMs with 0–1 Effectiveness
Here, we consider the extension of the model discussed in
Section 2.2, allowing each λj to be a function of yj . The cost
function of D and A are then given by





























i∈I (j) μi(xi) + λj (yj )
]
(45)





























i∈I (j) μi(xi) + λj (yj )
]
. (46)
PROPOSITION 2: The two-person game defined by (45)
and (46) has a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF: The conclusion follows from the arguments we
used to prove Proposition 1—here the convexity of W IID (x, y)
in x follows from Lemma 3 and the convexity of W IIA (x, y) in
y follows from the corresponding proof in Proposition 1. 
3.3. Multiple Parallel CMs with Varying Effectiveness
Here, we consider the extension of the model discussed at
the end of Section 2.3, allowing each λj to be a function of
yj . Of course, random times that were defined in terms of τj
will now depend on yj . We explicitly formulate only the case
where the rankings of the effectiveness of the CMs against
A’s technologies are the same (our analysis allows us to relax
this assumption but with cumbersome notation). Following
(22), the cost functions of D and A are then given by








































































PROPOSITION 3: The two-person game defined by (47)
and (48) has a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF: The proof follows from the arguments we used
to prove Proposition 1. Here, the convexity of W IIID (x, y) in x
follows from Lemma 4, and the convexity of W IIIA (x, y) in y
follows from the corresponding proof in Proposition 1. 
3.4. One Technology and Two CMs Developed in Series
Here, we consider the extension of the model analyzed in
Section 2.4 with one technology developed by A and two
CMs developed by D (n = 1 and m = 2), allowing λ to be a
function of y. The cost functions of D and A are then given by










































PROPOSITION 4: The two-person game defined by (49)
has a Nash equilibrium.
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PROOF: The conclusion follows from the arguments we
used to prove Proposition 1. Here, the convexity of W IVD (x, y)
in x follows from Lemma 6. Next consider W IVA (x, y). Given
x = (x1, x2), let a ≡ μ1(x1) > 0 and b ≡ μ2(x2) > 0. Then









(λ(y) + a)(λ(y) + b)
]
.
For the convexity of the first term, see the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. Next, the convexity of the second term follows from the
fact that λ(y) is concave in y and that 1
(λ+a)(λ+b) is decreasing










(λ + a)3(λ + b)
+ 2
(λ + a)2(λ + b)2 +
2




We recall that Section 2.4 includes a formulation of an
extension of the model discussed in this subsection to more
that two technologies developed by A (n > 2). We pose the
question of determining whether or not the objective func-
tions of D and A are convex in their allocation as an open
problem. A positive answer will facilitate the extension of
Proposition 4 to n > 2.
4. GENERAL DISTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we relax the assumption that random
completion times of the m technologies and n CMs have
exponential distribution and obtain generalizations of Propo-
sitions 1–3. Still, we continue to use the notation τj (yj ),
j = 1, . . . , m and ξi(xi), i = 1, . . . , n for the corresponding
random variables with yj and xi representing, respectively,
the allocation of A and D to the development of the j th tech-
nology and ith CM. These random variables are assumed to
be independent and have finite expectations (we recall that the
assumption that the τj (0)’s and ξi(0)’s have finite expectation
is referred to as the “nondegeneracy assumption”). But, here,
the corresponding cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)
of the τj (yj )s and ξi(xi)s are denoted Fj (t , yj ) and Gi(t , xi),
respectively. We assume that each of these CDFs has the fol-
lowing properties: for every t ≥ 0, Fj (t , yj ) and Gi(t , xi) is
increasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable in
the decision variable yj and xi , respectively, implying that
E[ξi(xi)] =
∫∞
0 (1 − Gi(xi , t))dt is decreasing and convex
in xi and, similarly, E[τj (yj )] is decreasing and convex in
yj .
1 The above assumptions assert that the E[ξi(0)]s and
E[τj (0)]s are finite (i.e., nondegeneracy), and they generalize
the structure of the exponential case considered in Sections
2 and 3.
LEMMA 7: With x and y representing vector variables,
let ξ(x) and τ(y) be non-negative independent random vari-
ables with finite expectation and CDFs G(t , x) and F(t , y),
respectively.
(i) If for every t , x ≥ 0, F(t , y) is increasing and con-
cave in y, then E[min{ξ(x), τ(y)}] is decreasing and
convex in y (for each x).
(ii) If for every t , y ≥ 0, G(t , x) is increasing and
concave in x, then E[ξ(x) − min{ξ(x), τ(y)}] is
decreasing and convex in x (for each y)
PROOF: The CDF of min{ξ(x), τ(y)} is 1 − [1 −




[1 − F(t , y)][1 − G(x, t)]dt
(51)
and




[1 − G(x, t)]dt −
∫ ∞
0




F(t , y)[1 − G(x, t)]dt . (52)
For each t ≥ 0, 1 − G(t , x) ≥ 0 and therefore [1 −
F(t , y)][1−G(x, t)] is decreasing and convex in y. Similarly,
for each t ≥ 0, F(t , y) ≥ 0 and therefore F(t , y)[1−G(x, t)]
is decreasing and convex in x. The asserted conclusions now
follow from the fact that the aforementioned monotonicity
and convexity are preserved under integration with respect
to t . 
Lemma 7 implies that if the cost functions of D and A are
given, respectively, by the first expression in (36) and (37)
and the CDFs of ξ and τ satisfy the assumptions of Lemma
1 The assumptions about Gi(·, ·) and Fj (·, ·) imply that for each
“regular” monotonically increasing function h : [0, ∞) → IR,
E[h(ξi(xi))] and E[h(τj (yj ))] is decreasing and convex. To see
the former, let gi(xi , ·) be the density function of ξi(xi). Then,
E[h(ξi(xi))] =
∫∞
0 h(t)gi(xi , t)dt = −h(∞)[1 − Gi(xi , ∞)] +
h(0)[1 − Gi(xi , 0)] +
∫∞
0 h




G(x, t))dt , here regularity means that integration by parts and
ignoring the fixed terms is allowed. As h′(t) ≥ 0 for each t , the
conclusions follow.
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7, then these cost functions are convex in x and y, respec-
tively. It then follows that the conclusions of Proposition 1
extend to the more general model.
A key tool in the derivation of results of Sections 2 and
3 distribution was the joint convexity of the expectation of
the minima of (exponential) development times. The assump-
tions we have imposed so far are not sufficient of extending
this property, and we need an additional property.
LEMMA 8: With x1, . . . , xm representing scalar vari-
ables, let ξ1(x1), . . . , ξm(xm) be non-negative, indepen-
dent random variables with finite expectation and CDFs
G1(t , x1), . . . , Gm(t , xm), respectively. If for every t ≥ 0,
Gi(t , xi) is increasing and 1 − Gi(t , xi) is log-convex in
xi , then the CDF of mini ξi(xi) is increasing and concave
in x = (x1, . . . , xn).
PROOF: Our assumptions imply that for every t ≥ 0,
log{∏nu=i[1 − Gu(xu, t)]} = ∑nu=i log[1 − Gu(xu, t)] is
(jointly) convex in x = (x1, . . . , xn); hence, ∏nu=i[1 −
Gu(xu, t)] is log-convex in x and therefore convex. Also, as
the [1−Gu(xu, t)]s are non-negative and decreasing, we have
that
∏n
u=i[1 −Gu(xu, t)] is decreasing in x. The conclusions
of the lemma now follow immediately from the observation
that the CDF of mini ξi(xi) is 1 −∏nu=i[1 − Gu(xu, t)]. 
We say that the CDFs of the development times of the CMs
are “co-log-convex in the resource-allocation” if for each
i = 1, . . . , m (j = 1, . . . , n) and each t ≥ 0, log[1−Gi(xi , t)]
is concave in xi . Lemma 8 implies that this assumptions
assures that the CDFs of the random variables mini∈I (j) ξ(xi)
appearing in (45) and (46) and the random variables ξ 〈x〉(x)
appearing in (47) and (48) are increasing and convex in x.
Consequently, if the above assumption holds for theGi(t , xi)s
and, in addition, each Fj (t , yj ) (the CDF of the τj (yj )) is
increasing and convex in yj , Lemma7 implies that the cost
functions of D and A considered by the first equality of
each of the expressions (45) and (46) and (47) and (48)
are convex in x and y, respectively. The proofs and con-
clusions of Propositions 2 and 3 can now be extended to the
more general framework. We finally note that the exponen-
tial distributions explored in Sections 2 and 3 satisfy the new
assumptions.
5. SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS
This article advances the modeling of R&D races by
considering asymmetric situations where winners only sus-
tain temporary advantage with respect to certain operational
capabilities. These types of races are mostly prevalent in
military conflicts, where weapons developed and deployed
on one side are confronted by CMs deployed by the other
side. Examples of such situations in the business world
relate to criminal activities, such as computer viruses and
counterfeiting currency.
The problem of allocating resources in such scenarios can
become rather complex, and in this article, we have only
started to unveil its layers of complexity. The article develops
optimization models (where actions of one party do not affect
the decisions of the other party) and then uses the results of
these models to construct four propositions that establish the
existence of Nash equilibria in scenarios in which actions of
each party affect the decisions of the other one.
Section 2.4 considers the case where D is restricted to serial
development of CMs: first, an intermediary CM that provides
some protection and only later a more advanced CM that pro-
vides full protection. Suppose D has the flexibility to choose
between serial development of the two CMs versus develop-
ing only the advanced CM. For linear intensity functions, the
choice between these two options will be determined by the
values of the closed form expressions of D’s costs as given in
(33) and (6) where the former corresponds to developing the
two CMs in series and the latter corresponds to developing
only the advanced CM.
We note that the Nash equilibrium analysis developed in
this article, like many other models based on noncooperative
game theoretical concepts that have recently appeared in the
operations management literature, assumes that each party
has complete information about the parameters that char-
acterizes itself and its rival. Of course, such an assumption
can be challenged (because in real-world settings the parties
have only partial information about each other). In fact, when
we observe the behavior of governments and insurgents, we
see that from time to time, one of the parties increases or
decreases its investments in developing weapons or CMs.
This can be explained as follows. When the race starts, each
side has a certain estimate (which might be no more than
an educated guess) about the capabilities and intentions of
the other party. Both parties solve their respective equations
and decide on their investment levels. These decisions hold
until one of the parties obtain additional (or more up-to-
date) information. Then, new decisions are computed, and
a new equilibrium is reached. Clearly, the analysis of such
cases is much more complicated, and we leave it to future
research.
One possible extension to this article is to allow D to bene-
fit from the CM during the period in which A’s technology is
not yet operational. For example, during this period, D may
deploy its CMs with greater flexibility and then operate them
more effectively against A. Still, it is probably safe to assume
that the benefit per unit time that D would gain during this
period is smaller than the damage per unit time that A would
inflict on D, if the CM is not yet available.
Specifically, we can consider a modification of the model
where the cost function of D would be
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WD(x) = x + d1E[ξ(x) − min{τ , ξ(x)}]
− d2E[τ − min{τ , ξ(x)}]
= x + d2E[ξ(x)] + (d1 − d2)E[ξ(x)
− min{τ , ξ(x)}] − d2E[τ ]. (53)
The assumption that the benefit that D gains during the
period is secondary to the damage that D suffers when A’s
technology is developed and the CM is not ready implies that
d1 > d2. As E[ξ(x)] and E[ξ(x) − min{τ , ξ(x)}] are con-
vex in x, this assumption implies that WD(x) is convex in x.
Consequently, Proposition 1 in Section 3 applies.
Another possible extension relates to the case where the
completion time of A’s technology depends on the allocation
of the resource by A, expressed by the parametric random
variable τ(y). In this case, WD(x, y) is represented by (53),
with τ(y) replacing τ , in particular, this function is convex
in x. Also, the expected cost of A will then be expressed by
WA(x, y) = y − d3E[ξ(x) − min{τ(y), ξ(x)}]
+ d4E[τ(y) − min{τ(y), ξ(x)}]]
= y − d3E[ξ(x)] + (d3 − d4)E[min{τ(y), ξ(x)}]
+ d4E[τ(y)]. (54)
The assumptions about the relative effectiveness of A’s
technology with no CM versus the opposite situation jus-
tify d3 > d4; as E[τ(y)] and E[min{τ(y), ξ(x)}] are convex
in y, we conclude that WA(x, y) is convex in y. It follows
that Proposition 1 holds for the modified utility function,
establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Another important area of future research is the extension
of the nonzero sum game presented in Section 4 to situations
in which part of each party’s investment is aimed at devel-
oping its technology (or CM), while another part is aimed
at disrupting the efforts of the other party to develop its
technology (or CM). For example, if D’s investment will
be given by the pair (x1, x2), and A’s investment will be
given by (y1, y2), the parameters for the respective distribu-
tion functions of the development times might be of the form:
μ(x1, y2) = a1+b1x1−c1y2 andλ(y1, x2) = a2+b2y1−c2x2.
A somewhat similar analysis, albeit at the strategic (national)
level, has recently been carried out by Poveda and Tauman
[25]. We expect that such scenarios may lead to interesting
findings with (possibly) multiple equilibria.
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